Jason A. Donenfeld 2021-02-24 13:15:08 +01:00 committed by David Bauer
parent 7d00f632b7
commit 7d4143234c
5 changed files with 1016 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
From 4a25324891a32d080589a6e3a4dec2be2d9e3d60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:18:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before
sending
commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.
The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:
panic+0x108/0x2ea
__stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
__icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160
In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:
// sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
// dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
dptr = dopt->__data;
// sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
// flowing the stack:
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
}
In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.
This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
__kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
kasan_report+0x32/0x40
check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
__ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
__icmp_send+0x744/0x1700
Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.
This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.
Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Jason: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
include/linux/icmpv6.h | 17 ++++++++++++++---
include/linux/ipv6.h | 1 -
include/net/icmp.h | 6 +++++-
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +++--
net/ipv6/icmp.c | 16 ++++++++--------
net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 12 +++++++-----
6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -539,7 +539,6 @@ static int gtp_build_skb_ip4(struct sk_b
if (!skb_is_gso(skb) && (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) &&
mtu < ntohs(iph->tot_len)) {
netdev_dbg(dev, "packet too big, fragmentation needed\n");
- memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
htonl(mtu));
goto err_rt;
--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#define _LINUX_ICMPV6_H
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <uapi/linux/icmpv6.h>
static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -15,13 +16,16 @@ static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
typedef void ip6_icmp_send_t(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr);
+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm);
#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_IPV6)
void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr);
-static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm);
+static inline void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm)
{
- icmp6_send(skb, type, code, info, NULL);
+ icmp6_send(skb, type, code, info, NULL, parm);
}
static inline int inet6_register_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn)
{
@@ -34,18 +38,28 @@ static inline int inet6_unregister_icmp_
return 0;
}
#else
-extern void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
+extern void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm);
extern int inet6_register_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn);
extern int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icmp_send_t *fn);
#endif
+static inline void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ __icmpv6_send(skb, type, code, info, IP6CB(skb));
+}
+
int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type,
unsigned int data_len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
#else
-#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send
+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 };
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
+}
#endif
#else
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ struct ipv6_params {
__s32 autoconf;
};
extern struct ipv6_params ipv6_defaults;
-#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
--- a/include/net/icmp.h
+++ b/include/net/icmp.h
@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_b
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);
#else
-#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send
+static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
+{
+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+}
#endif
int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -775,13 +775,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send);
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
+ struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct nf_conn *ct;
__be32 orig_ip;
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
return;
}
@@ -796,7 +797,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_i
orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;
- icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);
--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -331,10 +331,9 @@ static int icmpv6_getfrag(void *from, ch
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6)
-static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
- struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb);
struct ipv6_destopt_hao *hao;
struct in6_addr tmp;
int off;
@@ -351,7 +350,7 @@ static void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buf
}
}
#else
-static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb) {}
+static inline void mip6_addr_swap(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt) {}
#endif
static struct dst_entry *icmpv6_route_lookup(struct net *net,
@@ -446,7 +445,8 @@ static int icmp6_iif(const struct sk_buf
* Send an ICMP message in response to a packet in error
*/
void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
- const struct in6_addr *force_saddr)
+ const struct in6_addr *force_saddr,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && !icmpv6_global_allow(net, type))
goto out_bh_enable;
- mip6_addr_swap(skb);
+ mip6_addr_swap(skb, parm);
sk = icmpv6_xmit_lock(net);
if (!sk)
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8
/* select a more meaningful saddr from input if */
struct net_device *in_netdev;
- in_netdev = dev_get_by_index(net, IP6CB(skb)->iif);
+ in_netdev = dev_get_by_index(net, parm->iif);
if (in_netdev) {
ipv6_dev_get_saddr(net, in_netdev, &fl6.daddr,
inet6_sk(sk)->srcprefs,
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmp6_send);
*/
void icmpv6_param_prob(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 code, int pos)
{
- icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL);
+ icmp6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PARAMPROB, code, pos, NULL, IP6CB(skb));
kfree_skb(skb);
}
@@ -697,10 +697,10 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk
}
if (type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT,
- info, &temp_saddr);
+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2));
else
icmp6_send(skb2, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH,
- info, &temp_saddr);
+ info, &temp_saddr, IP6CB(skb2));
if (rt)
ip6_rt_put(rt);
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
@@ -33,23 +33,25 @@ int inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(ip6_icm
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_unregister_icmp_sender);
-void icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+void __icmpv6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
+ const struct inet6_skb_parm *parm)
{
ip6_icmp_send_t *send;
rcu_read_lock();
send = rcu_dereference(ip6_icmp_send);
if (send)
- send(skb, type, code, info, NULL);
+ send(skb, type, code, info, NULL, parm);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_send);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmpv6_send);
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
{
+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 };
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct in6_addr orig_ip;
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
return;
}
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb
orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6;
- icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+ __icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);

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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From a13827e9091c07e25cdeec9a402d74a27e2a1111 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: peer: put frequently used members above cache
lines
commit 5a0598695634a6bb4126818902dd9140cd9df8b6 upstream.
The is_dead boolean is checked for every single packet, while the
internal_id member is used basically only for pr_debug messages. So it
makes sense to hoist up is_dead into some space formerly unused by a
struct hole, while demoting internal_api to below the lowest struct
cache line.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct wg_peer {
struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue;
struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue;
int serial_work_cpu;
+ bool is_dead;
struct noise_keypairs keypairs;
struct endpoint endpoint;
struct dst_cache endpoint_cache;
@@ -61,9 +62,8 @@ struct wg_peer {
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct list_head peer_list;
struct list_head allowedips_list;
- u64 internal_id;
struct napi_struct napi;
- bool is_dead;
+ u64 internal_id;
};
struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg_device *wg,

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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 49da2a610d63cef849f0095e601821ad6edfbef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: device: do not generate ICMP for non-IP packets
commit 99fff5264e7ab06f45b0ad60243475be0a8d0559 upstream.
If skb->protocol doesn't match the actual skb->data header, it's
probably not a good idea to pass it off to icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, which is
expecting to reply to a valid IP packet. So this commit has that early
mismatch case jump to a later error label.
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: No peer has allowed IPs matching %pI6\n",
dev->name, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
- goto err;
+ goto err_icmp;
}
family = READ_ONCE(peer->endpoint.addr.sa_family);
@@ -201,12 +201,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf
err_peer:
wg_peer_put(peer);
-err:
- ++dev->stats.tx_errors;
+err_icmp:
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
icmpv6_ndo_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH, 0);
+err:
+ ++dev->stats.tx_errors;
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}

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@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
From 1771bbcc5bc99f569dd82ec9e1b7c397a2fb50ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: get rid of per-peer ring buffers
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
commit 8b5553ace83cced775eefd0f3f18b5c6214ccf7a upstream.
Having two ring buffers per-peer means that every peer results in two
massive ring allocations. On an 8-core x86_64 machine, this commit
reduces the per-peer allocation from 18,688 bytes to 1,856 bytes, which
is an 90% reduction. Ninety percent! With some single-machine
deployments approaching 500,000 peers, we're talking about a reduction
from 7 gigs of memory down to 700 megs of memory.
In order to get rid of these per-peer allocations, this commit switches
to using a list-based queueing approach. Currently GSO fragments are
chained together using the skb->next pointer (the skb_list_* singly
linked list approach), so we form the per-peer queue around the unused
skb->prev pointer (which sort of makes sense because the links are
pointing backwards). Use of skb_queue_* is not possible here, because
that is based on doubly linked lists and spinlocks. Multiple cores can
write into the queue at any given time, because its writes occur in the
start_xmit path or in the udp_recv path. But reads happen in a single
workqueue item per-peer, amounting to a multi-producer, single-consumer
paradigm.
The MPSC queue is implemented locklessly and never blocks. However, it
is not linearizable (though it is serializable), with a very tight and
unlikely race on writes, which, when hit (some tiny fraction of the
0.15% of partial adds on a fully loaded 16-core x86_64 system), causes
the queue reader to terminate early. However, because every packet sent
queues up the same workqueue item after it is fully added, the worker
resumes again, and stopping early isn't actually a problem, since at
that point the packet wouldn't have yet been added to the encryption
queue. These properties allow us to avoid disabling interrupts or
spinning. The design is based on Dmitry Vyukov's algorithm [1].
Performance-wise, ordinarily list-based queues aren't preferable to
ringbuffers, because of cache misses when following pointers around.
However, we *already* have to follow the adjacent pointers when working
through fragments, so there shouldn't actually be any change there. A
potential downside is that dequeueing is a bit more complicated, but the
ptr_ring structure used prior had a spinlock when dequeueing, so all and
all the difference appears to be a wash.
Actually, from profiling, the biggest performance hit, by far, of this
commit winds up being atomic_add_unless(count, 1, max) and atomic_
dec(count), which account for the majority of CPU time, according to
perf. In that sense, the previous ring buffer was superior in that it
could check if it was full by head==tail, which the list-based approach
cannot do.
But all and all, this enables us to get massive memory savings, allowing
WireGuard to scale for real world deployments, without taking much of a
performance hit.
[1] http://www.1024cores.net/home/lock-free-algorithms/queues/intrusive-mpsc-node-based-queue
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 12 ++---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.h | 15 +++---
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 28 ++++-------
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h | 4 +-
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 45 ++++++++++++-----
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 16 +++---
drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 31 ++++--------
8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ static void wg_destruct(struct net_devic
destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_receive_wq);
destroy_workqueue(wg->handshake_send_wq);
destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq);
- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true);
- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true);
+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue);
+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue);
rcu_barrier(); /* Wait for all the peers to be actually freed. */
wg_ratelimiter_uninit();
memzero_explicit(&wg->static_identity, sizeof(wg->static_identity));
@@ -338,12 +338,12 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne
goto err_destroy_handshake_send;
ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->encrypt_queue, wg_packet_encrypt_worker,
- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS);
+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_destroy_packet_crypt;
ret = wg_packet_queue_init(&wg->decrypt_queue, wg_packet_decrypt_worker,
- true, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS);
+ MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_free_encrypt_queue;
@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ static int wg_newlink(struct net *src_ne
err_uninit_ratelimiter:
wg_ratelimiter_uninit();
err_free_decrypt_queue:
- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue, true);
+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->decrypt_queue);
err_free_encrypt_queue:
- wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue, true);
+ wg_packet_queue_free(&wg->encrypt_queue);
err_destroy_packet_crypt:
destroy_workqueue(wg->packet_crypt_wq);
err_destroy_handshake_send:
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.h
@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@ struct multicore_worker {
struct crypt_queue {
struct ptr_ring ring;
- union {
- struct {
- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker;
- int last_cpu;
- };
- struct work_struct work;
- };
+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker;
+ int last_cpu;
+};
+
+struct prev_queue {
+ struct sk_buff *head, *tail, *peeked;
+ struct { struct sk_buff *next, *prev; } empty; // Match first 2 members of struct sk_buff.
+ atomic_t count;
};
struct wg_device {
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
@@ -32,27 +32,22 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg
peer = kzalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!peer))
return ERR_PTR(ret);
- peer->device = wg;
+ if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL))
+ goto err;
+ peer->device = wg;
wg_noise_handshake_init(&peer->handshake, &wg->static_identity,
public_key, preshared_key, peer);
- if (dst_cache_init(&peer->endpoint_cache, GFP_KERNEL))
- goto err_1;
- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue, wg_packet_tx_worker, false,
- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS))
- goto err_2;
- if (wg_packet_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue, NULL, false,
- MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS))
- goto err_3;
-
peer->internal_id = atomic64_inc_return(&peer_counter);
peer->serial_work_cpu = nr_cpumask_bits;
wg_cookie_init(&peer->latest_cookie);
wg_timers_init(peer);
wg_cookie_checker_precompute_peer_keys(peer);
spin_lock_init(&peer->keypairs.keypair_update_lock);
- INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work,
- wg_packet_handshake_send_worker);
+ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_handshake_work, wg_packet_handshake_send_worker);
+ INIT_WORK(&peer->transmit_packet_work, wg_packet_tx_worker);
+ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->tx_queue);
+ wg_prev_queue_init(&peer->rx_queue);
rwlock_init(&peer->endpoint_lock);
kref_init(&peer->refcount);
skb_queue_head_init(&peer->staged_packet_queue);
@@ -68,11 +63,7 @@ struct wg_peer *wg_peer_create(struct wg
pr_debug("%s: Peer %llu created\n", wg->dev->name, peer->internal_id);
return peer;
-err_3:
- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false);
-err_2:
- dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache);
-err_1:
+err:
kfree(peer);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -197,8 +188,7 @@ static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head
struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(rcu, struct wg_peer, rcu);
dst_cache_destroy(&peer->endpoint_cache);
- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->rx_queue, false);
- wg_packet_queue_free(&peer->tx_queue, false);
+ WARN_ON(wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue) || wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue));
/* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key
* material and other potentially sensitive information.
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct endpoint {
struct wg_peer {
struct wg_device *device;
- struct crypt_queue tx_queue, rx_queue;
+ struct prev_queue tx_queue, rx_queue;
struct sk_buff_head staged_packet_queue;
int serial_work_cpu;
bool is_dead;
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct wg_peer {
rwlock_t endpoint_lock;
struct noise_handshake handshake;
atomic64_t last_sent_handshake;
- struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work;
+ struct work_struct transmit_handshake_work, clear_peer_work, transmit_packet_work;
struct cookie latest_cookie;
struct hlist_node pubkey_hash;
u64 rx_bytes, tx_bytes;
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.c
@@ -9,8 +9,7 @@ struct multicore_worker __percpu *
wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr)
{
int cpu;
- struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker =
- alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker);
+ struct multicore_worker __percpu *worker = alloc_percpu(struct multicore_worker);
if (!worker)
return NULL;
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(
}
int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function,
- bool multicore, unsigned int len)
+ unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
@@ -31,25 +30,78 @@ int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_qu
ret = ptr_ring_init(&queue->ring, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return ret;
- if (function) {
- if (multicore) {
- queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(
- function, queue);
- if (!queue->worker) {
- ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
- } else {
- INIT_WORK(&queue->work, function);
- }
+ queue->worker = wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(function, queue);
+ if (!queue->worker) {
+ ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL);
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
-void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore)
+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue)
{
- if (multicore)
- free_percpu(queue->worker);
+ free_percpu(queue->worker);
WARN_ON(!__ptr_ring_empty(&queue->ring));
ptr_ring_cleanup(&queue->ring, NULL);
}
+
+#define NEXT(skb) ((skb)->prev)
+#define STUB(queue) ((struct sk_buff *)&queue->empty)
+
+void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue)
+{
+ NEXT(STUB(queue)) = NULL;
+ queue->head = queue->tail = STUB(queue);
+ queue->peeked = NULL;
+ atomic_set(&queue->count, 0);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(
+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, next) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.next) -
+ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty) ||
+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, prev) != offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty.prev) -
+ offsetof(struct prev_queue, empty));
+}
+
+static void __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(skb), NULL);
+ WRITE_ONCE(NEXT(xchg_release(&queue->head, skb)), skb);
+}
+
+bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (!atomic_add_unless(&queue->count, 1, MAX_QUEUED_PACKETS))
+ return false;
+ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, skb);
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *tail = queue->tail, *next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail));
+
+ if (tail == STUB(queue)) {
+ if (!next)
+ return NULL;
+ queue->tail = next;
+ tail = next;
+ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(next));
+ }
+ if (next) {
+ queue->tail = next;
+ atomic_dec(&queue->count);
+ return tail;
+ }
+ if (tail != READ_ONCE(queue->head))
+ return NULL;
+ __wg_prev_queue_enqueue(queue, STUB(queue));
+ next = smp_load_acquire(&NEXT(tail));
+ if (next) {
+ queue->tail = next;
+ atomic_dec(&queue->count);
+ return tail;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#undef NEXT
+#undef STUB
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
@@ -17,12 +17,13 @@ struct wg_device;
struct wg_peer;
struct multicore_worker;
struct crypt_queue;
+struct prev_queue;
struct sk_buff;
/* queueing.c APIs: */
int wg_packet_queue_init(struct crypt_queue *queue, work_func_t function,
- bool multicore, unsigned int len);
-void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue, bool multicore);
+ unsigned int len);
+void wg_packet_queue_free(struct crypt_queue *queue);
struct multicore_worker __percpu *
wg_packet_percpu_multicore_worker_alloc(work_func_t function, void *ptr);
@@ -135,8 +136,31 @@ static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online
return cpu;
}
+void wg_prev_queue_init(struct prev_queue *queue);
+
+/* Multi producer */
+bool wg_prev_queue_enqueue(struct prev_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+/* Single consumer */
+struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_dequeue(struct prev_queue *queue);
+
+/* Single consumer */
+static inline struct sk_buff *wg_prev_queue_peek(struct prev_queue *queue)
+{
+ if (queue->peeked)
+ return queue->peeked;
+ queue->peeked = wg_prev_queue_dequeue(queue);
+ return queue->peeked;
+}
+
+/* Single consumer */
+static inline void wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(struct prev_queue *queue)
+{
+ queue->peeked = NULL;
+}
+
static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(
- struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct crypt_queue *peer_queue,
+ struct crypt_queue *device_queue, struct prev_queue *peer_queue,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct workqueue_struct *wq, int *next_cpu)
{
int cpu;
@@ -145,8 +169,9 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d
/* We first queue this up for the peer ingestion, but the consumer
* will wait for the state to change to CRYPTED or DEAD before.
*/
- if (unlikely(ptr_ring_produce_bh(&peer_queue->ring, skb)))
+ if (unlikely(!wg_prev_queue_enqueue(peer_queue, skb)))
return -ENOSPC;
+
/* Then we queue it up in the device queue, which consumes the
* packet as soon as it can.
*/
@@ -157,9 +182,7 @@ static inline int wg_queue_enqueue_per_d
return 0;
}
-static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(struct crypt_queue *queue,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- enum packet_state state)
+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state)
{
/* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the
* peer can be freed from below us.
@@ -167,14 +190,12 @@ static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_
struct wg_peer *peer = wg_peer_get(PACKET_PEER(skb));
atomic_set_release(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state, state);
- queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu,
- peer->internal_id),
- peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &queue->work);
+ queue_work_on(wg_cpumask_choose_online(&peer->serial_work_cpu, peer->internal_id),
+ peer->device->packet_crypt_wq, &peer->transmit_packet_work);
wg_peer_put(peer);
}
-static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(struct sk_buff *skb,
- enum packet_state state)
+static inline void wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, enum packet_state state)
{
/* We take a reference, because as soon as we call atomic_set, the
* peer can be freed from below us.
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ packet_processed:
int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(napi, struct wg_peer, napi);
- struct crypt_queue *queue = &peer->rx_queue;
struct noise_keypair *keypair;
struct endpoint endpoint;
enum packet_state state;
@@ -455,11 +454,10 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct
if (unlikely(budget <= 0))
return 0;
- while ((skb = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL &&
+ while ((skb = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->rx_queue)) != NULL &&
(state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(skb)->state)) !=
PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) {
- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring);
- peer = PACKET_PEER(skb);
+ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->rx_queue);
keypair = PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair;
free = true;
@@ -508,7 +506,7 @@ void wg_packet_decrypt_worker(struct wor
enum packet_state state =
likely(decrypt_packet(skb, PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair)) ?
PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED : PACKET_STATE_DEAD;
- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, state);
+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, state);
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
}
@@ -531,12 +529,10 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data(struc
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)))
goto err;
- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue,
- &peer->rx_queue, skb,
- wg->packet_crypt_wq,
- &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu);
+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->decrypt_queue, &peer->rx_queue, skb,
+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->decrypt_queue.last_cpu);
if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE))
- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_napi(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD);
+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_rx(skb, PACKET_STATE_DEAD);
if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE)) {
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return;
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c
@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_
wg_packet_send_staged_packets(peer);
}
-static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct sk_buff *first,
- struct wg_peer *peer)
+static void wg_packet_create_data_done(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *next;
bool is_keepalive, data_sent = false;
@@ -262,22 +261,19 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data_done(s
void wg_packet_tx_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct crypt_queue *queue = container_of(work, struct crypt_queue,
- work);
+ struct wg_peer *peer = container_of(work, struct wg_peer, transmit_packet_work);
struct noise_keypair *keypair;
enum packet_state state;
struct sk_buff *first;
- struct wg_peer *peer;
- while ((first = __ptr_ring_peek(&queue->ring)) != NULL &&
+ while ((first = wg_prev_queue_peek(&peer->tx_queue)) != NULL &&
(state = atomic_read_acquire(&PACKET_CB(first)->state)) !=
PACKET_STATE_UNCRYPTED) {
- __ptr_ring_discard_one(&queue->ring);
- peer = PACKET_PEER(first);
+ wg_prev_queue_drop_peeked(&peer->tx_queue);
keypair = PACKET_CB(first)->keypair;
if (likely(state == PACKET_STATE_CRYPTED))
- wg_packet_create_data_done(first, peer);
+ wg_packet_create_data_done(peer, first);
else
kfree_skb_list(first);
@@ -306,16 +302,14 @@ void wg_packet_encrypt_worker(struct wor
break;
}
}
- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&PACKET_PEER(first)->tx_queue, first,
- state);
+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, state);
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
}
}
-static void wg_packet_create_data(struct sk_buff *first)
+static void wg_packet_create_data(struct wg_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *first)
{
- struct wg_peer *peer = PACKET_PEER(first);
struct wg_device *wg = peer->device;
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -323,13 +317,10 @@ static void wg_packet_create_data(struct
if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(peer->is_dead)))
goto err;
- ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue,
- &peer->tx_queue, first,
- wg->packet_crypt_wq,
- &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu);
+ ret = wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer(&wg->encrypt_queue, &peer->tx_queue, first,
+ wg->packet_crypt_wq, &wg->encrypt_queue.last_cpu);
if (unlikely(ret == -EPIPE))
- wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer(&peer->tx_queue, first,
- PACKET_STATE_DEAD);
+ wg_queue_enqueue_per_peer_tx(first, PACKET_STATE_DEAD);
err:
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
if (likely(!ret || ret == -EPIPE))
@@ -393,7 +384,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_staged_packets(struc
packets.prev->next = NULL;
wg_peer_get(keypair->entry.peer);
PACKET_CB(packets.next)->keypair = keypair;
- wg_packet_create_data(packets.next);
+ wg_packet_create_data(peer, packets.next);
return;
out_invalid:

View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 514091206bc055a159348ae8575276dc925aea24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 17:25:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: kconfig: use arm chacha even with no neon
commit bce2473927af8de12ad131a743f55d69d358c0b9 upstream.
The condition here was incorrect: a non-neon fallback implementation is
available on arm32 when NEON is not supported.
Reported-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com>
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ config WIREGUARD
select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86 if X86 && 64BIT
select ARM_CRYPTO if ARM
select ARM64_CRYPTO if ARM64
- select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if (ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON
+ select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON if ARM || (ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON)
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_NEON if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM if ARM
select CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON if ARM && KERNEL_MODE_NEON